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Memory & Cognition
/992. 20 (3), 277-290

Remembering emotional events
ALAFAIR BURKE, FRIDERIKE HEUER, and DANIEL REISBERG
Reed College, Portland, Oregon
Recent experiments have implied that emotional arousal causes a narrowing of attention and,
therefore, impoverished memory encoding. In contrast, other studies have found that emotional
arousal enhances memory for all aspects of an event. We report two experiments investigating
whether these differing results are due to the different retention intervals employed in past studies
or to their different categorization schemes for the to-be-remembered material. Our results indicate a small role for retention interval in moderating emotion's effects on memory. However,
emotion had markedly different impacts on different types of material: Emotion improved memory for gist and basic-level visual information and for plot-irrelevant details associated, both temporally and spatially, with the event's center. In contrast, emotion undermined memory for details not associated with the event's center. The mechanisms for emotion's effects are discussed.
The emotional events in one's life tend to be remembered with great clarity and detail (e.g., Bohannon, 1988;
Brown & Kulik, 1977; Christianson & Loftus, 1990;
Pillemer, 1984; Reisberg, Heuer, McLean, & O'Shaughnessy, 1988; Rubin & Kozin, 1984; White, 1989). But
how accurate are these memories? There are a number
of cases in which conspicuous errors have been documented in the recall of emotional events, despite the great
vividness and high confidence attached to these memories (Christianson, 1989; Linton, 1975, pp. 386-387;
McCloskey, Wible, & Cohen, 1988; Neisser, 1982;
Neisser & Harsch, 1990; Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1990).
Apparently, neither emotionality nor vividness provides
any guarantee of memory accuracy.
In fact, there is reason to believe that emotional events
may be remembered less completely than neutral events.
According to the Easterbrook hypothesis, physiological
arousal leads to a "narrowing" of attention-that is, a
reduction in the range of cues to which an organism is
sensitive (e.g., Bruner, Matter, & Papanek, 1955; Easterbrook, 1959; Eysenck, 1982; Mandler, 1975). Since
arousal generally accompanies emotion, emotion should
also lead to this narrowing of attention. This should in
tum lead to impoverished memories, since the "center"
of the event might be well remembered, but little else will
be. If, therefore, many details are subsequently recalled,
these are likely to be after-the-fact reconstructions and,
thus, open to error.
A number of studies have examined these claims, but
with conflicting results. Much of the research has examined memory for specific details about emotional events
(color of clothing, details of background, etc.). It is
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presumably just these details that might be excluded by
the hypothesized narrowing of attention. These specific
details about an episode also cannot be reconstructed from
more generic knowledge, making these details a good index of memory per se. Finally, it is precisely the abundance of these details that seems to characterize the
"vividness" with which emotional events are recalled.
Many studies have found that arousal' has an adverse
effect on memory for detail (e.g., Clifford & Hollin,
1981; Clifford & Scott, 1978; Deffenbacher, 1983; Loftus
& Burns, 1982; Siegel & Loftus, 1978; for a review, see
Heuer & Reisberg, in press). For example, Loftus and
Bums (1982) showed subjects a brief film clip depicting
a bank robbery. For half of the subjects, the film showed
the robber run out of the bank with two men pursuing
him. The robber then turned and shot a small boy in the
face. For the remaining subjects, the film was the same
until the shooting, but then cut back to the inside of the
bank, where the manager was telling everyone to remain
calm. Immediately after viewing the film, subjects' memories were tested for the early part of the film (i.e., the
portion of the film identical for the two groups). Subjects
who had seen the neutral version remembered more detail, a finding that emerged both with recognition and
recall testing.
In contrast, at least a few studies have found that arousal
benefits memory for detail (e.g., Andrews, 1990; Dorman,
1989; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990). For example, Heuer and
Reisberg (1990) showed subjects a series of slides depicting a story. In the neutral version of the story, a mother
takes her son to visit his father at work. The father is a
mechanic, and the son watches the father repair a car.
The arousal version of the slides was identical to the neutral version except for the middle of the sequence; the
father in the arousal version is a surgeon, and the son
watches as the father performs surgery.
Subjects viewed one of these stories, then, two weeks
later, completed both a recall test and a four-alternative
forced-choice (4AFC) recognition test. In both tests, mem-
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ory was assessed for central and for peripheral information. Central information was defined as any fact or element pertaining to the basic story that could not be
"changed or excluded without changing the basic story
line. " This categorization relied on a basic-level description of the episode depicted in the slides (Rosch, 1978;
see also Morris & Murphy, 1990; Rifkin, 1985; Vallacher
& Wegner, 1987). An example of central information was
the fact that the father was a surgeon and not a pediatrician. An example of peripheral information was the color
of the mother's sweater. Heuer and Reisberg found that
subjects who viewed the arousing sequence remembered
more of both central and peripheral information than did
those who viewed the neutral sequence.
Thus, there is a conflict in the available evidence. The
Heuer and Reisberg result (and others cited above) seems
to contradict that obtained by Loftus and Bums (and
others), showing that arousal undermines memory. We
note that the latter finding is by far more common in the
literature, and, indeed, the studies showing beneficial effects of arousal are largely from a single laboratory (our
own). We therefore need to be cautious in interpreting
these results. Nonetheless, our studies have been consistent in showing an arousal advantage for detail memory,
and we have observed this effect with a variety of procedures and a variety of story materials. Thus, we need to
ask why these findings are at odds with other results in
the literature.
Unfortunately, our understanding of this data pattern is
hindered by the diversity of procedures and stimuli employed throughout this literature. For example, the studies
already described have employed different stimuli, different memory tests, different instructions, and different retention intervals; at present, we have little information
about how these factors influence arousal's memory effects. What therefore seems called for is a systematic examination of these factors, in order to map how these
shape the data.
The present article reports two such "parametric"
studies, examining the (potential) interaction among arousal,
retention interval, and type ofto-be-remembered material.
In addition, we report data on the impact of repeated memory testing for emotionally arousing events (i.e., withinsubject comparisons of immediate and delayed test). Before turning to the studies, though, we summarize the considerations that led us to focus on these factors.
Most of the studies showing negative effects of arousal
(that is, better memory by the control subjects) have employed short retention intervals. For example, Christianson (1984), Christianson and Loftus (1991), Clifford and
Hollin (1981), Clifford and Scott (1978), Deffenbacher
(1983), Kebeck and Lohaus (1986), Loftus and Bums
(1982) and Siegel and Loftus (1978) all report evidence
that emotional arousal undermines memory accuracy, and
all employed retention intervals under I h. In contrast,
a number of authors have employed retention intervals
of 2 weeks or longer, and they report that arousal improves memory for detail (Andrews, 1990, Studies I and 2;

Christianson, 1984; Dorman, 1989; Heuer & Reisberg,
1990; Snyder, 1989).
We need to be cautious, however, about drawing conclusions from this pattern across diverse studies. Fortunately, a few studies have directly examined the interaction between emotional arousal and retention interval.
Unfortunately, the relevant results are difficult to interpret. For example, Kleinsmith and Kaplan (1963, 1964)
found that memory for emotional words was poorer than
for neutral words when subjects were tested immediately;
after a l-week delay, this pattern reversed, and retention
was better for emotional material. (For reviews of related
studies, see Craik & Blankstein, 1975; Eysenck, 1976;
Hockey, 1978.) However, it is unclear how to apply these
findings to questions of detail memory, since the to-beremembered materials in these early studies consisted of
simple word lists, quite unlike the complex stimuli employed by Loftus and Bums or by Heuer and Reisberg.
A small number of studies, though, have examined the
relation between arousal, retention interval, and memory
for complex events. Christianson (1984) had subjects view
either a neutral or an arousing story depicted in a slide
sequeoce." Memory was tested either 12 min after the presentation or after 2 weeks. Half of the subjects were asked
to recall the main content of the slides they had seen; the
others were given a recognition test, with the distractors
differing from the originally presented slides only in camera angle. (Hence, correct choices depended on memory:
for various details about the layout of the slide-exactly
what was visible, what was occluded, and so on.) WWt
a short retention interval, subjects who viewed the neutral slide sequence performed better in this recognition
test than did those who viewed the arousing slides. With
a long retention interval, this pattern reversed. A similar
interaction between story type and retention interval (but
without the crossover) appeared in the recall data.
Christianson's data indicate that retention interval is an
important variable in assessing arousal's effects on memory. However, a more recent study failed to replicate this
arousal x interval interaction: Christianson and Loftus
(1987) employed the same stimuli and retention intervals
as those used in Christianson's earlier study, but they
found that arousal undermined detail memory (again, for
camera angle) in both the immediate and the delayed tests.
These contrasting data patterns are possibly due to the different instructions given to subjects in these two studies,
but this suggestion stands merely as a conjecture about
this apparent data conflict.
The role of retention interval was also examined by Kebeck and Lohaus (1986). In their procedure, subjects were
shown either an arousing version of a film or a neutral
version; memory was tested immediately after the film
and then again 2 weeks later. The data indicate no arousal
effect on memory for gist; however, subjects who viewed
the arousing version of the film showed poorer memory
for peripheral detail in both the immediate andthe delayed
test. These fmdings indicate that arousal's effects are not
influenced by retention interval, contrary to the Chris-
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tianson (1984) and the Kleinsmith and Kaplan (1963,
1964) findings. However, it is hard to know if the delayed
test in Kebeck and Lohaus' s study was influenced by the
earlier experience of the immediate testing. That is, subjects' own recall in the immediate test could have functioned as postevent information, which is known to influence subsequent memory performance (Loftus, 1979).
Indeed, the literature contains several reports of subjects'
early recall contaminating later recall (Bartlett, 1932; Belbin, 1950). This makes the Kebeck and Lohaus findings
difficult to interpret.
These studies leave unresolved the issue of how retention interval moderates arousal's effects on memory and
also raise a question about what role might be played by
repeated testing. As mentioned earlier, the importance of
retention interval is clearly suggested by various studies
showing negative effects of emotional arousal at short delays and the studies showing positive effects at long delays.
However, we are apprehensive about these comparisons
across studies, largely because the to-be-remembered materials are so different. This brings us to the second main
focus of the present experiments.
The Easterbrook hypothesis (described earlier) leads to
the claim that attention will be narrowed during emotional
events, so that some aspects of the event will be excluded
from attention and so poorly remembered later on. Other
aspects of the event will be attended and so, perhaps, better remembered. Thus, the hypothesis predicts that emotion's effects will be uneven, clearly interacting with type,
or perhaps location, of the to-be-remembered material.
A similar claim derives from the phenomenon of weapon
focus, an effect alleged for witnesses to violent crimes,
in which the witness's attention is caught by the weapon,
to the exclusion of much else. (Heuer & Reisberg, in
press, provide a review of the weapon-focus literature.)
The weapon-focus claim, like the Easterbrook hypothesis, posits a narrowing of attention in emotional situations,
and so, once again, leads to the expectation of emotion
having uneven effects on the to-be-remembered material.
A number of researchers have sought to test these claims
by categorizing the to-be-remembered material into central and peripheral information and asking how these are
individually influenced by emotion. Unfortunately, these
categories have been defined in various ways in the literature, making it difficult to pool the evidence. For example, Heuer and Reisberg (1990) used a distinction between
plot-relevant and plot-irrelevant materials in distinguishing central and peripheral information; they found that
arousal improved memory for both of these categories of
information. In contrast, Christianson and Loftus (1991)
report that arousal improved memory for central materials, but at the cost of memory for peripheral information. However, in their study, detail that was merely "associated with" central characters in the plot (e.g., the
color of the central character's coat) was defined as central, even if this detail was plot irrelevant. Thus, Heuer
and Reisberg employed a conceptual distinction to identify peripheral information; Christianson and Loftus em-
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ployed a perceptual/spatial distinction. These categorization schemes often overlap, since, in filmed events,
plot-relevant material is often visually central. Nonetheless, the difference in definitions makes interpretation of
the evidence difficult.
These variations in definitions, and in the to-beremembered materials, draw attention to an important
problem: If emotion has different effects on different types
of information, these will go undetected unless we partition the to-be-remembered material appropriately. The
problem, of course, is that we do not know which partition is the correct one. At least for now, therefore, it seems
appropriate to let our investigations of emotion's impact
be data driven and to treat the type of the to-be-remembered
material as a parameter to be systematically varied. It is
this approach that we have taken in the present studies.
We therefore report two experiments exploring these
various issues. The experiments differ in several details,
but both have the same outline: One group of subjects
viewed a series of slides depicting an emotionally arousing story; one group viewed a series of slides depicting
a neutral (but otherwise comparable) story. Within each
group, some subjects were tested immediately, and others
at a delay. Memory was probed for four different types
of material (described below), thus treating type of tobe-remembered material as a variable to be systematically
assessed. Finally, the data were subdivided according to
phase of the story: an initial phase (prior to the arousal
manipulation), a second phase in which the arousal manipulation took place, and a final phase (identical for the
two groups). This allowed us to examine possible proactive and retroactive effects of emotion on memory.
Thus, overall, both studies have multifactorial designs,
with factors of story type, retention interval, type of tobe-remembered material, and story phase.
The two experiments reported here are similar in many
ways. Therefore, we first describe each study's design
and methods, then we present the results in a single, combined Results section. 3

EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, we explored two issues relevant to
emotion's effects on memory. First, we examined the
claim that emotion's effects on memory depend largely
on retention interval. To this end, we replicated the Christianson (1984) design, but with new stimuli and new tobe-remembered materials. As discussed above, this replication seems critical, given the seeming conflict between
Christianson's results and those of Christianson and Loftus
(1987). The experimental comparison here is straightforward: Half of our subjects viewed emotional materials,
and half viewed neutral materials. Within each group,
some subjects were tested immediately after the story presentation, others were tested after a l-week delay, and
still others were tested after a 2-week delay.
Second, the present study was designed to examine how
emotion influences memory for different types of to-be-
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remembered material. To this end, we recategorized the
test items used by Heuer and Reisberg (1990) into four
types of information: Heuer and Reisberg's central information (i.e., plot relevant or plot defining) was subdivided
into gist and basic-level visual information; their peripheral category (i.e., plot-irrelevant material) was subdivided into central details and background details. (This
subcategorization builds on the spatial distinction proposed
by Christianson & Loftus, 1991. Details of our entire categorization scheme appear below.)
Method
Subjects. Seventy-two volunteers participated as subjects, recruited from two liberal-arts campuses in the Portland area.:' Two
subjects failed to appear for the second experimental session; their
data were removed and these subjects were replaced. The subjects
were randomly assigned to groups, with the provision that each group
contain approximately equal numbers of male and female subjects.
Materials and Apparatus. The stimuli were identical to those
employed by Heuer and Reisberg (1990). They consisted of 12
slides, each accompanied by a tape-recorded sentence of narration.
The slides were projected onto a rear-projection screen at a size
of20x 14 in. The subjects were seated about 31 in. from the screen.
Each slide was shown for 6 sec, with a I-sec interstirnulus interval. The taped sentences were heard from a speaker placed behind
the screen. Each sentence began approximately 500 msec after the
appropriate slide was projected and lasted approximately 4 sec.
The first three slides and the final four were identical for the two
groups. In Slides 1-4 (Phase I), a mother and son are going to visit
father at work. Slide 4 shows the father's workplace-the outside
of a hospital for the arousal group, the outside of a garage for the
neutral group. In the third phase, Slides 9-12, the mother leaves
the father's workplace, makes a telephone call to her boss, and hails
a cab. The arousal manipulation occurred in Phase 2, Slides 5-8.
In the neutral slides, the father is a mechanic who is repairing a
car. For the arousal group, the father is a surgeon who is operating
on a victim of a car accident. The arousing slides depict a team
of surgeons bending over a patient whose internal organs are plainly
visible (Slide 6), the injured legs of a child (Slide 7), and the father
removing his surgical gloves (Slide 8). For both groups, there were
II color and I black-and-white slide. (This variation was included
as a detail for which memory could be assessed; the black-andwhite slide was in the eighth position in the sequence, i.e., in the
second phase.)
As mentioned, seven of the slides were identical for the two
groups. The five differing slides were matched as closely as possible for content and visual form. For example, Slide 6 for the neutral version showed a group of mechanics huddling over an automobile, with its engine plainly visible. The number and position of
the mechanics, camera angle, and so on were approximately matched
to those of the arousal group's Slide 6. Likewise, Slide 7 for the
neutral version showed a broken automobile part, with its layout
and background matched to that of Slide 7 for the arousal group.
Finally, the sentences of narration for each slide were also matched
for length and form. (The specific sentences are listed in Heuer
& Reisberg, 1990.)
To assess subjects' level of physiological arousal, heart rate was
monitored by a CIC heart rate speedometer, with a photosensitive
cell attached to the subject's earlobe. The monitor gave a digital
output that was recorded by the experimenter for baseline rates and
for changes during the slide presentation. In order to keep subjects
steady, their heads were stabilized in chinrests. The equipment and
the experimenter were hidden behind the projection screen during
the procedure to minimize distraction.
Memory for the slide material was assessed with a recognition
test, containing 119 questions (10 per slide, with I removed be-

cause of ambiguity). All of the questions were in 4AFC format,
with the position of the target counterbalanced among the four alternatives. The questions themselves had been categorized earlier
into four types. Two of the categories subdivided the materials Heuer
and Reisberg had classified as central, and two divided their peripheral category. The categorization of items was done by the first
two authors. Even with independent judgments, there was a 95 %
level of agreement. (Disputes were settled by the third author.)
The following criteria were used in the categorization of the questions: (1) Any fact or element that one would include when narrating the story of the slide material was considered to be gist (e.g.,
that father is the chief surgeon and not a pediatrician). Items in this
category were roughly the basic-level answers to the question, "What
happened next?" No items pertaining to the visual presentation of
the material were included in this category. (2) Basic-level visual information included any element one would mention when describing what the slide showed-essentially a basic-level answer to the
question, "What does this slide show?" For example, that a slide
showed mother hailing a cab, and not walking, would be in this category. (3) Central detail included peripheral (plot-irrelevant) information associated with the central figures in the story (e.g., the
color of the mother's sweater, given that mother was centrally
depicted in the slide). (4) Finally, any detail not concerned with
the central characters was considered background detail (e.g.,
whether a slide centrally depicting a broken car also contained other
cars in the background).
Table I provides examples of the questions in each category. For
Phases I and 3, identical questions were asked of the neutral and
arousal subjects. For Phase 2, every effort was made to match the
questions asked of the two groups, although this was more difficult
for gist and for basic-level visual information than for the other categories of information. Even in Phase 2, however, many of the questions asked of the arousal subjects were identical to those asked of
the neutral subjects (e.g., the colors of central objects in the slide,
or the time of day at which an event took place, or whether a slide
depicted bothrmther and child, or either, or bystanders, or 00 people).
The test questions were presented to all subjects in the same sequence; this was because many of the questions presupposed answers to earlier questions (e.g., a question might ask whether the
mother was visible in a particular slide; a subsequent question might
ask what the mother was carrying). Within this constraint, the distribution of categories of questions was balanced as much as possible. That is, the four categories of test items were distributed across
the memory test as evenly as possible.
Finally, as part of a separate experiment, the subjects also completed a brief (10-15 min) questionnaire before taking the memory test. The questionnaire assessed (by self-report) the length of
time subjects tend to think about various events before and after
they occur.
Design. Halfof the subjects viewed the arousing slides, and half
viewed the neutral slides. As indicated above, each of these slide
sequences was divided into three phases, with the middle phase including the arousal manipulation. This division into phases was only
for purposes of analysis; nothing marked the phases from the perspective of the subjects.
In order to examine the effects of retention interval, half of the
subjects (i.e., 18 arousal subjects, 18 neutral subjects) were assigned
to an immediate-test condition (10 to IS-min delay). The remaining subjects were assigned to the delayed-test condition. Within this
latter group, half of the subjects (i.e., 9 arousal subjects, 9 neutral
subjects) were tested after a I-week delay, and half were tested after
a 2-week delay.
Procedure. The subjects were tested individually, in two sessions. Because the memory test was to be incidental, the subjects
were told at the outset that the purpose of the experiment was to
measure "physiological arousal in reaction to various stimuli." The
first session began with measurement of subjects' baseline heart
rate. The subjects were seated (and given the instructions for the
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Table I
Examples of Test Items for Each Type of Information

Item Type

Number of Test
Items
Neutral
Arousal

Gist

25

25

Basic-level
visual information

14

15

Examples
Slide 3: What are they [mother & child) going to do?
a. run errands
b. go to get the car
c. visit a relative
d. go to see the pediatrician
Slide 5, neutral: The people in the slide are

a. walking by
b. helping to hook up the towtruck
c. looking at the broken car
d. talking to a policeman
Slide 5, arousal: The people in the slide are
a. standing and staring at the accident
b. rushing towards the scene
c. helping to clear the debris lying around
d. being questioned by a policeman

Central details

29

31

Slide II: Mother is leaning

a. on a ball
b. on the shelf under the phone
c. against the wall
d. on her purse
Background details

51

48

Slide 6, neutral: In the background you can see
a. other cars in the garage
b. a toolbench
c. a hydraulic lift
d. none of these

Slide 6, arousal: In the background you can see
a. lamps
b. an I-V setup
c. a sink
d. none of these
Note-The correct answer is indicated by a bold-face letter.
procedure) for approximately 5 min. Heart rate was then measured
for a period of 30 sec. The lowest heart rate occurring during this
period was recorded as the baseline heart rate. Heart rate measures
were then continued during the slide presentation. The lowest heart
rate occurring during the 6-sec presentation of each slide was
recorded as the heart rate for that slide.
After viewing the slides, the subjects in the delay groups were
instructed that during their second session, they would complete
two questionnaires measuring their affective response to the slides;
they were then dismissed. The subjects in the immediate-test group
stayed and completed the memory test. All subjects completed a
brief questionnaire (10-15 min) prior to the memory test and were
then given the recognition test, administered by computer. The question and four choices were presented on the screen and remained
in view until the subject entered his/her answer, at which time the
next question appeared. Immediately following the recognition test
was a debriefing session in which the experimenter explained the
hypotheses of the experiment.

EXPERIMENT 2
As we will see in a moment, the results of Experiment 1
were complex, and, therefore, a replication seemed warranted. In addition, because the results of Experiment 1
indicated no contrast between 1- and 2-week testing, we
eliminated the cumbersome 2-week retention interval in
Experiment 2 and turned to a new issue: We mentioned

earlier that some studies in the literature have examined
retention interval's role via within-subject comparisons,
testing the same subjects both immediately after viewing
the to-be-remembered material and after a delay. One
might wonder, however, whether the repeated testing itself influences memory performance. To pursue this question, we tested half of the subjects in Experiment 2 immediately after they had viewed the slides, and then we
retested them I week later. We tested the remaining subjects for the first time at a l-week delay. This allowed
comparison between subjects tested for the first time after
I week and those tested for the second time after the same
delay.

Method
Subjects. Forty undergraduates initially participated in the experiment. Three (2 in the arousal/repeated test group and I in the
neutral/repeated test group) did not return for their second experimental session, andso 3 additional subjects were recruited. (Data
from the 3 nonretuming subjects are included in our heart-rate analyses, and in our assessment of immediate memory performance.
This is reflected in the degrees of freedom for the relevant comparisons.) The subjects were not paid; however, for participation,
the subjects were entered in a lottery for $50. The subjects were
randomly assigned to the four experimental groups (arousal story
vs. neutral; single test after I week vs. initial test immediately, retest
after I week).
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Materials, Apparatus, and Design. The stimuli and apparatus
were identical to those used in Experiment I. The experiment employed a 2x3x4x3 design, with variables of story (arousal vs.
neutral), phase of the slide material, type of information, and test
schedule. Story, phase, and type of information were all as described
in Experiment 1. Note that the fourth factor, test schedule, has a
peculiar status, with one within-subject comparison (immediate testing vs. retesting at I week) and one between-subject comparison
(immediate testing vs. testing for the first time after I week). For
analysis, these comparisons were kept separate and addressed in
independent analyses of variance (ANOVAs).
Procedure. The procedure was the same as that used in Experiment I, except for the following changes. The subjects in the singletest group were dismissed immediately after the slide sequence. For
the subjects in the repeated-test group, the presentation of the slides
was followed by a brief description of the memory test. The test
was then administered, ending the first session's procedure. All subjects were instructed to refrain from discussing the experiment with
other possible subjects.
All subjects were told to return 1 week later. Single-test subjects
expected at that time to see another series of slides, then complete
a questionnaire assessing their reactions to the material. Repeatedtest subjects expected a procedure identical to the first, but with
new slide material. In the second session, all subjects were given
the memory test for the slide material-the first presentation of these
test materials for single-test subjects, and the second presentation
for repeated-test subjects.
In addition, we were concerned about the computer administration of the memory test, employed in Experiment I. Given the length
of the memory test (119 items), we feared that the subjects might
grow weary of the test, cease taking it seriously, and so give us
a poor estimate of what they remembered. To avoid this problem,
we used an interview procedure in Experiment 2, in place of the
computer-administered memory test. The test items and the response
alternatives were read to the subjects by the experimenter; the subjects' responses were given vocally and recorded by the experimenter. This procedure obviously risks bias from experimenter demand, but, as we will see, the results provide no indication that
such bias occurred.
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RESULTS

Figure 1. Heart rate data, by story type and by pbase of presentation. The top pueI shows the results of Experiment 1; the hottom panel shows the results of Experiment 2.

Baseline heart rates ranged from 49 to 118 beats per
minute (bpm) in Experiment 1, and from 49 to 88 bpm
in Experiment 2. Baseline heart rates of neutral and
arousal subjects were quite similar-within 1.4 bpm (71.9
vs. 70.5 bpm in Experiment 1; 68.0 vs. 68.9 bpm in Experiment 2). In neither experiment was there a reliable
difference in baseline rates between the groups (both
ts < .60).
During the slide presentation, heart rate was recorded
during each slide. The lowest rates per slide were then
averaged for each subject, to yield values for each of the
phases of the slide presentation. A 2 x3 (story x phase)
ANOVA on these data shows no main effect of story in
either procedure (Fs < 1, for the two experiments). In
both experiments, heart rates showed a decline across the
three phases [F(2,14O) = 3.740, MSe = 4.492,p < .03,
and F(2,76) = 9.322, MSe = 4.477, P < .001].
Critically, though, there was a reliable interaction between story and phase in both of the experiments [F(2, 140)
= 7.217, MSe = 4.055,p < .001; andF(2,76) = 4.025,
MSe = 4.166, P < .05]. As can be seen in Figure 1, the

subjects who viewed the arousing slides showed a pronounced decrease in heart rate starting in the middle phase
of the slides, while neutral subjects' heart rates remained
relatively flat. Post hoc comparisons confirmed that neutral subjects showed no effect of phase in either study (both
Fs < 1), whereas arousal subjects showed an effect of
phase in both studies [F(2,70) = 9.630, MSe = 4.493,
and F(2,38) = 11.899, MSe = 3.318, bothps < .001].
We urge caution, however, in reading Figure I, since
the figure is potentially misleading in one regard. The figure implies a difference between groups in Experiment 2,
Phase 1; if reliable, this would imply a premanipulation
difference between the groups. However, this effect is nowhere close to statistically reliable. The only reliable effect in the heart rate data is the heart rate decrease in the
arousal group, and this result requires a word of explanation.
These arousal data replicate Heuer and Reisberg's
(1990) findings-that is, the arousal group showed a deceleration in heart rate, not the heart rate acceleration one

Heart Rate Data

MEMORY AND EMOTION
associates with a defensive reaction toward noxious stimuli. However, the literature identifies two distinct heart
rate patterns that characterize arousal. In addition to the
acceleration pattern, Lacey and Lacey (1974) argued that
some stimulation evokes an orienting response, which,
in tum, is linked to a feedback mechanism through which
cardiac deceleration increases cortical arousal. Likewise,
Bohlin and Graham (1977) argued that heart rate deceleration occurs with the specific type of arousal associated
with an orienting response (see also Graham, 1979,
pp. 137-167). We note in passing that this heart rate deceleration is not unique to our stimuli, but also appeared
in other procedures designed to test the Easterbrook claim
(e.g., Christianson, 1984). We note in addition that the
animal studies cited in support of the Easterbrook claim
also presumably involve this "orienting" type of arousal,
inasmuch as the arousal stimulus in these studies is typically food for food-deprived animals.

100

uu

..
o
o

~

80

70 , . -_ _-...:::::.....~-._"

60

+ - - - - - - -....- - - - - - - - - ,

Memory for Gist
Figure 2 shows subjects' performance in remembering
gist, with Experiment I shown in the top panel and Experiment 2 in the bottom. As can be seen, there was a
strong effect of interval, indicating (not surprisingly) that
subjects tested immediately remembered more than did
those tested I week or 2 weeks later [F( I ,68) = 58.754,
MS. = .025, and F(1,39) = 45.205, MS. = .017, both
ps < .0001]. In addition, both studies showed an effect
of phase [F(2,136) = 30.218, MS. = .015, andF(2,78) =
4.835, MS. = .018, both ps < .025], with memory
poorest for the story's middle phase.
Of main interest, though, are the story effects. The
arousal story generally led to a memory advantage, primarily lodged in Phase 2. This emerged in Experiment I
as a story x phase interaction [F(2, 136) = 2.899, MS. =
.015, p < .06]; Experiment 2 showed a weak trend in
the same direction [F(2,78) = 2.28, MS. = .018, p <
. 12]. Experiment 2 also showed a trend toward a story
effect [F(1,39) = 3.135, MS. = .077,p < .09],whereas
Experiment I did not.
Experiment 2 also yielded a reliable story x interval
interaction [F(1,39) = 12.521, MS. = .017, p < .005].
Tukey tests revealed that the interaction was due to the
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One-Week Versus Two-Week Testing
Experiment I allowed a comparison between subjects
tested for the first time after a l-week delay and subjects
tested for the first time after a 2-week delay. Analyses
of this contrast indicated no main effect of interval
[F(I,32) < I] and no interactions between interval and
other variables (all Fs < 2.40, all ps > .137). Apparently then, for these materials, forgetting had reached its
asymptote by I week. Therefore, in all further analyses,
the 1- and 2-week groups were collapsed into one "delay"
group for comparison to the immediate-test group. This
carries the additional advantage of allowing side-by-side
comparisons of Experiments I and 2, as can be seen in
the next section.

283

..................::::::::::::B::::::.:.::::::::::::::::::::::::.:...:

90

..

Neutral·lmmed
Arousal-lmmed
Neutral·Delay
Arousal· Delay

U
U

0
0

80

-:.e.
0
70

60

1

2

3

Phase
Figure 2. Memory acclll'llCy for JUt, by story type lUId by phase
of presentation. The top panel shows the results of Experiment 1;
the bottom panel sbows the results of Experiment 2.

absence of a story effect in immediate testing but a reliable story effect in the delayed test.

Memory for Basic-Level Visual Information
Figure 3 shows memory results for basic-level visual
information (BLVI)-that is, information that described,
in basic-level terms, what each slide depicted. First, there
was again a strong effect of interval, with immediate testing
yielding better performance than delayed testing [F( 1,68)
= 48.39, MS. = .057, and F(1 ,39) = 44.31, MS. = .037,
both ps < .0001]. There was also an effect of phase
[F(2,136) = 15.738, MS. = .045, and F(2,78) = 3.862,
MS. = .039, both ps < .05], reflecting the fact that
Phase 3 was more poorly remembered than the other
phases.
The effects of story paralleled those observed with gist:
Arousal improved memory, with the effect primarily visible in Phase 2. In Experiment I, this emerged as a reliable story x phase effect [F(2, 136) = 3.547, MS. = .045,
p < .05], with arousal subjects showing better memory
for the second phase of the story material [F(1,201) =
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Memory for Central Detail
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Figure 4 shows the results for memory for central
detail-plot-irrelevant detail that was nonetheless spatially
associated with some plot-relevant character or action.
Again, we see a strong effect of interval [F(I,68) =
108.82, MSe = .015, andF(I,39) = 19.955, MSe = .027,
both ps < .0002]. In Experiment I, there was an overall advantage for the arousal story [F(I,68) = 12.36,
MSe = .015, P < .001]. Most striking, though, is the
story x phase interaction, plainly visible in both studies
[F(2,136) = 14.144, MSe = .018, and F(2,78) = 18,953,
MSe = .022, both ps < .0001]. Post hoc tests indicated
no difference between the groups in Phase 1 of either
experiment, but a strong arousal advantage in Phase 2
[F(l,203) = 39.727, MSe = .017, and F(l,1l6) =
22.046, MSe = .023, bothps < .001]. In Experiment 2,
the arousal subjects then had a reliable disadvantage in
remembering Phase 3 of the story [F(I, 116) = 11.859,
MSe = .023, p < .01].
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7.431, MSe = .049, p < .01]. In contrast (and continuing the parallel with gist), Experiment 2 did not show a
story x phase effect, but did show a trend toward a main
effect of story [F(l,39) = 3.56, MSe = .038, p < .07].
Finally, and still paralleling the results for gist, there was
no story x interval effect in Experiment I, but there was
a trend toward this interaction in Experiment 2 [F(l,39) =
3.932, MSe = .037, p < .06].
In sum, memory for gist showed a different pattern from
memory for BLVI (e.g., with regard to phase), but both
were affected similarly by arousal. Arousal seemed to convey a memory advantage for both categories of information, with the effect mostly visible in the story's middle
phase (i.e., where the arousal manipulation took place).
In Experiment I, this emerged as a story x phase effect
for both gist and BLVI; in Experiment 2, this emerged
as a trend toward a story x phase effect for gist and a
main effect of story for both categories of information.
The effects of story were clearly smaller with immediate
testing, and, in fact, Experiment 2 yielded a reliable story
x interval effect for both gist and BLVI.
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story's central (plot-relevant or pIot-deftDiDg) cbancters. The top
panel shows the results of Experiment 1; the bottom panel shows
the results of Experiment 2.
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The results of Experiment 2 also showed a reliable story

x phase x interval interaction [F(2,78) = 3.912, MSe =
.022, p < .05]. This interaction reflected the fact that
all story effects (the arousal advantage in Phase 2, and
the arousal disadvantage in Phases I and 3) were more
pronounced in immediate testing than they were at a delay.

Memory for Background Detail
Figure 5 shows the data for memory for background
detail-plot-irrelevant detail that is spatially removed from
"the action." There was a strong effect of interval
[F(l,68) = 47.272, MSe = .015, and F(l,39) = 36.477,
MSe = .014, both ps < .0001]; there was also a main
effect of phase, with performance at its worst for the
story's middle phase [F(2,136) = 21.674, MSe = .009,
and F(2,78) = 8.105, MSe = .010, both ps < .001].
Both experiments also showed reliable story effects
[F(l,68) = 5.678, MSe = .015, and F(l,39) = 10.821,
MSe = .014, both ps < .05], with a reliable disadvantage
in performance for arousal subjects. This effect of story
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plot-Irrelevant details truly In the peripbery (I.e., not spatiallyassodIIted with any central chander). The top panel shows the results
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interacted with phase in both experiments [F(2, 136) =
12.64, MSe = .009, and F(2,78) = 6.199, MSe = .010,
both ps < .005]; in both cases, this reflected the fact that
the arousal disadvantage was most prominent in remembering Phase 2 (the locus of the arousal manipulation).
To summarize memory for detail, a story x phase interaction clearly emerged for both central detail and background detail. However, for central detail, this interaction
reflected a Phase 2 advantage for arousal subjects, an advantage not seen (or reversed) in the other phases. For
background detail, we see the opposite pattern: a Phase 2
disadvantage for arousal subjects, with much smaller story
effects in the other phases. Interactions between interval
and story were inconsistent, appearing for central detail
in Experiment I and (weakly) for background detail in
Experiment 2. The pattern of this interaction, when it
occurred, was generally for effects of story that were
stronger in immediate testing than in delayed testing. Note
that this is the reverse of the interaction observed with
gist and BLVI, in which story effects tended to be weaker
in immediate testing (we return to this below).
Effects of Repeated Testing
Recall that subjects tested immediately in Experiment 2
were also retested after I week, allowing us to examine
the impact of repeated testing. The results of these comparisons are easily described: First, subjects tested for the
second time after I week remembered considerably more
than did those tested for the first time after I week. For
gist, subjects tested for the first time after I week remembered 77 % of the items overall; subjects retested after I
week remembered 94% [F(l,36) = 46.586, MSe = .018,
p < .0001]. For BLVI, subjects tested for the first time
after I week remembered 57% of the items tested, and
subjects retested after I week remembered 82 % [F( 1,36)
= 48.15, MSe = .039, p < .001]. The pattern continues
for central details [35% vs. 48%; F(1,36) = 18.196, MSe
= .00.7, p < .000.], and for background details [42 % vs.
54%; F(I,36) = 48.446, MSe = .009, p < .0001].
We can also compare the I-week retest data with the
results of the immediate test. (Note that this comparison
is within subjects). Interestingly, we found no reliable contrasts in this comparison, for any of the four information
categories. That is, the relevant ANOVAs yielded no main
effects of interval (immediate vs. I week), and interval
did not interact with any other variables. The latter result
is quite striking: Apparently, the immediate test served
to "lock" a memory pattern in place, so that the l-week
retest data resemble the immediate-test results far more
than they resemble the l-week first test results.
For example, in remembering gist, Experiment 2 subjects showed no story effect in the immediate testing, but
a reliable story effect in the l-week first test. The l-week
retest data show the former pattern, not the latter. As one
assessment of this, an ANOVA was performed on the
I-week data, with factors of story (neutral vs. arousal),
test schedule (first test vs. retest), and phase. The ANOVA
yielded a story x schedule interaction [F(l,36) = 7.479,
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MSe = .018, P < .01], with an arousal effect in the singletest group but none in the retest group. The data were
similar for BLVI, with a clear story X schedule effect
[F(1,36) = 5.139, MSe = .039, P < .05] again reflecting the presence of a story effect in the single-test group
but none in the retest group. (Note that the parallel comparisons cannot be made for central or background details:
As we have already seen, these categories of information
showed no contrasts between the results of immediate testing and those of the l-week first test. Hence, for these
categories, we cannot ask whether the l-week retest shows
the profile of immediate testing or of delayed testing.)
In summary, overall performance levels for the l-week
retest resembled those for immediate testing, not l-week
first testing. When we could differentiate the patterns of
immediate and l-week first testing, the retest data show
the former profile, not the latter.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We have surveyed a complex pattern of results, so it
seems appropriate to highlight the main fmdings. The
effects of story were visible but weak for plot-relevant
material (gist and BLVI), andp values of.06 and.m were
common in these analyses. The effects of story were quite
robust, however, in memory for details (both central and
background details). To give just one example, Experiment 1 yielded a weak story x phase effect for gist (p <
.06) but a substantial story x phase effect for central detail
(p < .00(1). Similar contrasts can be found throughout
the data. Arousal clearly influenced detail memory more
than it influenced memory for central materials.
Focusing on Phase 2 of the story (the phase in which
the arousal manipulation took place), arousal improved
memory for plot-relevant information (i.e., gist and BLVI).
This arousal advantage was evident in both experiments,
but it emerged in slightly different ways: In Experiment 1,
the advantage was confined to Phase 2, and so a story x
phase interaction was observed. The results of Experiment 2 showed a story main effect but no interaction between story and phase. (This contrast may simply reflect
a difference in power between the two designs; in Experiment I there were almost twice as many subjects as in
Experiment 2). Overall then, the data plainly show a memory advantage for the arousing materials themselves, but
they are equivocal as to whether arousal has proactive or
retroactive memory effects.
For central detail, both experiments showed a strong
story X phase interaction, with an arousal advantage in
remembering details of Phase 2. For background detail,
the pattern simply reversed: Both experiments again
showed a strong story x phase interaction, but this time
with an arousal disadvantage in remembering Phase 2.
For central detail, Experiment 1 showed a main effect of
story, but this effect was almost entirely lodged in Phase 2
(see Figure 4). For background detail, both experiments
showed main effects of story, but, again, this effect was
mainly visible in Phase 2 (see Figure 5).

In discussing these results, we will focus on the three
questions with which we began this study: What is the
role of retention interval in moderating emotion's memory effects? What is the role of repeated testing? Does
emotion have different effects on different categories of
to-be-remembered material? We consider each of these
questions in tum; the data provide clear answers for the
second and third of these and tentative answers for the
first. We then tum to a broader, but crucial, question.
Our arousal and neutral stories obviously differ in many
regards; is it possible, then, that these story differences
account for the observed data pattern? Or are we justified
in attributing the data to emotion?

EtTects of Interval
We began this study with a conjecture that emotion's
memory effects were moderated by retention interval, a
conjecture fueled by several lines of evidence. The present
results are consistent with the pattern in the literature, but,
in the end, provide weak support for claims about retention interval's role. In Experiment 1, no reliable interactions were observed between interval and the factors
of main interest here. This was true both in the comparison between 1- and 2-week testing and in the comparison
between immediate and delayed testing. Experiment 2,
however, did yield the predicted interactions: For both
gist and BLVI, story effects were observed in delayed testing but not in immediate testing. In seeming contrast, cen-.
tral detail showed a stronger effect of the story manipulation in immediate testing than it did in delayed testing.
Experiment 2 yielded no story x interval effects for background detail.
What should we make of this pattern? Our data indicate
that retention interval's effects are not robust (consistent
with the Christianson & Loftus, 1987, nonreplication of
Christianson's, 1984, results), since we have observed
them in one experiment only. However, the retentioninterval effects that we did observe are consistent with
a claim advanced by many authors, namely that emotion
serves to retard the processes of forgetting (see Heuer &
Reisberg, in press, for a review). A number of mechanisms might produce this slowed forgetting, including
••stronger" encoding of emotional events at the time they
occur (e.g., Gold, 1987), or perhaps a retrieval advantage
for emotional events, as other retrieval paths decay (cf.
Eich & Metcalfe, 1989). Whatever the mechanism, this
proposal of retarded forgetting leads to two predictions:
First, the advantages of emotion, when these occur, should
increase over time. Second, the disadvantages of arousal,
when these occur, should shrink over time, since an initial advantage for neutral subjects would be offset by their
disadvantage for retention. This is, of course, the pattern
of the story x interval interactions (when these occurred)
in the present results. There was one exception to this pattern in our results, but the exception is easily accommodated: In Experiment 2, with central detail, arousal subjects began with an advantage, but this advantage shrank
in the l-week test. However, the neutral subjects' per-
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formance in this immediate test was almost at chance
level. Given this floor performance, there was not much
for neutral subjects to forget, and so arousal subjects' perfonnance suffered more from forgetting in this case. Thus,
the gap between the groups was smaller in delayed testing.
At present, it is not clear why retention interval played
a stronger role in Experiment 2 than in Experiment I, although we are reminded here of the replication concerns
that plague the "mood and memory" literature (see
Blaney, 1986; Eich & Metcalfe, 1989; Ellis & Ashbrook,
1989). The unreliability of these results remains a problem for future study.

Effects of Repeated Testing
Unlike our tentative claims about retention interval, we
can offer strong conclusions about the effects of repeated
testing. After a retention interval of I week, the results
clearly depended on whether the subject was being tested
for the first time or the second. Subjects retested after
a week performed better than did those tested for the first
time after the same delay. However, the rehearsal not only
improved performance, it also changed the pattern of performance. That is, the effects of arousal in the l-week
second test clearly resembled those in the immediate test
and did not resemble those in the l-week first test. Perhaps the rehearsal inherent in the immediate test served
to freeze a memory pattern in place; perhaps subjects simply remembered their responses from the earlier test and
wished to be self-consistent. In either case, this effect of
repeated testing indicates a clear need for caution in interpreting studies that compare immediate and delayed tests
using within-subject designs (e.g., Buckhout, Alper, Chern,
Silverberg, & Slomovits, 1974; Cutler, Penrod, & Martens,
1987; Kebeck & Lohaus, 1986).

Effect of Category of
To-Be-Remembered Material
Without question, the strongest results of the present
study are those showing a complex relation between story ,
phase of presentation, and type of to-be-remembered material. Arousal improved memory for gist, for BLVI, and
for details that happened to be associated spatially with
the event's center. In contrast, arousal undermined memory for background detail.
Our story variable also interacted with phase, and this
interaction was itself moderated by type of to-beremembered material. This pattern was most striking for
the two categories of detail: For central detail, both experiments showed an arousal advantage in Phase 2, but
not in the other phases. For background detail, we observed the opposite pattern: an arousal disadvantage in
remembering background, primarily lodged in Phase 2.
The general pattern of these results is that emotion aided
memory for materials tied to the "action" in the event.
This included information about the plot itself (gist and
BLVI), but also included plot-irrelevant detail when that
detail information was spatially and temporally linked to
the arousal event (i.e., central details from the story's sec-
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ond phase). When the temporal link to the action was
broken (as in central details from the first and third
phases), memory was not improved by arousal. (Indeed,
Experiment 2 showed an arousal disadvantage in remembering Phase 3's central details.) Likewise, when the spatiallink to the action was broken (as in background details), arousal produced a memory disadvantage, not the
advantage observed elsewhere in the study.
Why does emotion have these selective effects? We have
argued elsewhere (e. g., Reisberg & Heuer, in press) that
this pattern reflects the joint action of several mechanisms. First, both the Easterbrook hypothesis and claims
about "weapon focus" imply that attention is narrowed
during emotional events. However, the Easterbrook claim
is explicitly a claim about physiological arousal, whereas
the weapon-focus effects may derive from other mechanisms-informativeness or distinctiveness of the weapon,
rather than arousal (see Heuer & Reisberg, in press).
Thus, the impact of arousal may simply converge with
the impact of informativeness, with both contributing
(under appropriate circumstances) to a narrowing of attention. As a related point, the nature of an emotional
event seems certain to shift one's "informational priorities. " That is, when experiencing an emotional event, one
has neither the resources nor the inclination to "enjoy the
scenery. " This also will serve to rivet attention on the
central action, effectively leading, once again, to narrowed
attention.
The mechanisms just sketched would lead to a narrowing of attention during an emotional episode, with obvious consequences for memory. In addition, we suggest
that emotional events are also thought about differently
from neutral events, both during the event and subsequently, and this too will contribute to the character of
what is remembered. Christianson and Loftus (1991) and
Heuer and Reisberg (in press) have argued that one thinks
about emotional events in more "personal," more "psychological" terms, attending closely (for example) to the
thoughts and feelings of the participants in the event. Correspondingly, one thinks about these events less in schematic or abstract ways. This tendency will be fueled in
part by the inherent interest of emotional events, and also
by the sheer distinctiveness of most emotional events. In
any case, these tendencies will be revealed in the pattern
of what is remembered; they can also be detected if we
ask subjects directly what they thought about an emotional
event (Christianson & Loftus, 1991); they can also be detected in the pattern of intrusion errors in memory for
emotional events (Heuer & Reisberg, 1990).

Story Effects Versus Emotion Effects
In our discussion so far, we have assumed that the differences between neutral and arousal subjects can be attributed to emotion. That is, these subjects show different memory patterns because one group is remembering
an emotional story and one group is remembering a neutral story. But is this justified? We designed the neutral
and emotional stories to be comparable in content, in com-

288

BURKE, HEUER, AND REISBERG

plexity, and in coherence; we also matched the content
and layout of the slides as best we could. However, the
fact remains that the two slide sequences and the two stories were different, and one might argue that it is these
differences that lead to the memory data. For example,
one might suppose that subjects have more elaborate
scripts for "doctor stories" than for "mechanic stories,"
quite independent of emotion. Or one might suppose that
subjects found it incongruous that a surgeon would allow
his son to watch him at work, while no such surprise was
created by the mechanic story. Again, could it be this,
rather than emotion, that underlies our results?
This is an important problem for all studies of emotion's memory effects. Therefore, it seems worthwhile
to dwell a moment on how this problem should be addressed. In principle, one could remove this story/arousal
confound by using identical stories for the two groups and
manipulating arousal in some manner external to the stories. That is, one group of subjects might watch a story
after a period of exercise or while sitting next to a fearful
object. We could then compare this group's performance
with that of a group watching the story under more benign circumstances. This would obviously eliminate any
effects of story per se. Unfortunately, though, this procedure will not serve our purposes: There is reason to
believe that arousal extrinsic to the to-be-remembered
materials may influence memory in a way different from
emotion somehow related to the to-be-remembered material (Christianson & Mjorndal, 1985; Christianson, Nilsson, Mjorndal, Perris, & TjeUden, 1986). That is, "memory while emotional" may be distinct from "memory for
emotional materials." Thus, to study memory for emotional materials, one needs to manipulate the to-beremembered material itself. This leaves in place the concern about story/arousal confounding.
As a consequence of this, we cannot eliminate a story
confound from our studies, but we can take steps to
minimize this concern. We can also design our studies
to eliminate some specific suggestions for what the confound might be. For example, Dorman (1989) showed
subjects a brief excerpt from a commercially produced
horror movie. Subjects in the arousal group were given
a summary of the film up to that point, then they saw the
excerpt, accompanied by its frightening background
music. Subjects in the neutral group were given a bogus
summary of the film (but one that fit with the content of
the excerpt) and were then shown a carefully edited version of the film. S For the neutral subjects, the visual track
was left untouched, as was the dialogue at the start of the
clip. All that was changed was the soundtrack that accompanied the latter part of the clip, replacing the frightening music with some lighthearted Mozart. Subjects' memory for the film was then tested 2 weeks later.
Dorman's data are broadly consistent with the present
results. In particular, Dorman found a memory advantage
associated with arousal. A closer comparison of Dorman's
data with the present results is not possible, since Dorman's stimulus materials will not support the fine-grained

categorization scheme employed here. What is crucial for
present purposes, though, is that Dorman's study involved
visually identical stories. Therefore, at the least, we can
eliminate accounts of the data in terms of setting, the number and appearance of the players, and so forth.
More recently, Burke (1991) showed subjects a series
of slides depicting a "first date," with a man coming to
a woman's apartment for dinner. The neutral and arousal
versions of the story were visually identical except for
one slide; arousal was manipulated thematically (via the
narration) rather than visually. In the neutral version, the
narration described a pleasant and unexceptional date; in
the arousal version, the narration revealed the man's intentions to attack the woman. Thus, the neutral and emotional stories involved identical casts of characters and
identical settings. For most of the story's duration, even
the actual events depicted were identical. Even with this
matching, however, Burke's data again reproduced the
pattern reported here, with emotion conveying a memory advantage for gist and central details. Once again,
this implies that it is emotion, not story effects, that is
crucial for these effects.
Finally, other research lines have employed a different strategy in addressing the story/emotion confound by
examining manipulations other than manipulations of the
to-be-remembered materials. For example, Andrews
(1990) tested subjects' memory for scenes selected from
commercially successful movies. Subjects were identified,'
who had seen these films 6 months or more prior to the
memory study; memory was tested for several target
scenes within each film. Andrews selected target scenes
matched as far as possible for duration, placement within
the film, and relevance to plot. Each scene, in addition,
had been assessed by a panel of judges either as being
bland and unemotional or as being highly emotional.
Subjects remembered the emotional scenes from these
movies more accurately than they remembered the neutral
scenes. Crucially for present purposes, though, subjects
in this study had also filled out a separate measure, roughly
assessing how "arousable" they were, at least according
to self-report. This measure, developed by Mehrabian
(1977a, 1977b), asks subjects how bothered they are by
changes in weather, how long after a fight they remain
angry, and so on. This variable interacted with the type
of to-be-remembered material, such that subjects who were
more arousable also had a greater memory advantage for
the arousing movie scenes. This interaction between scene
type and arousability implies that emotionality is indeed
the key factor in distinguishing the neutral and emotional
scenes. That is, one might be concerned that the emotional
scenes in these movies differed in some other way from
the neutral scenes-perhaps being longer or more relevant to the plot. However, these factors would not be expected to interact with the individual-difference variable.
In sum, it seems that the present memory results can
be attributed to emotion and not to story effects. We reiterate, though, the need for caution on this theme. Emotional
stories are different from neutral stories. The studies just
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cited used memory measures in several ways different
from the measures employed in the present experiments.
Further work is clearly needed on this issue, but, for the
moment, the accumulation of evidence does justify speaking in terms of emotion's memory effects.

The Present Results and "Weapon Focus"
Overall then, the present data fit with other findings
alleging a narrowing (or redirecting) of attention during
emotional events. However, we note one regard in which
our data seem to diverge from other findings in the literature: In demonstrations of the weapon-focus effect, memory is improved for the weapon and details of the hand
holding the weapon; this is at the expense of memory for
the face of the person wielding the weapon (Kramer,
Buckhout, & Eugenio, 1990; Loftus, Loftus, & Messo,
1987; Maass & Kohnken, 1989). But in our classification scheme, both of these (details of hand, details of face)
would count as central details, since both are spatially and
temporally associated with a central character. Therefore,
within our scheme, both face and hand details should be
affected similarly by emotion. Yet this is not what the
weapon-focus data show.
There are several ways to address this apparent discrepancy. It may well be that the weapon-focus phenomenon
simply yields a different pattern from that of emotionality. Alternatively, it may tum out that our classification
scheme is not quite right: In the present study, we have
distinguished between details associated with an event's
central characters and those not. This categorization rests
heavily on information's relevance to an episode's plot.
But one could equally well distinguish between details associated with whatever was central to subjects' attention
and those not. These two distinctions will often be highly
correlated (i.e., one tends to pay attention to information
pertinent to plot). Given this correlation, the present data,
designed to explore the former distinction, can plausibly
be reinterpreted as documenting the latter. On the latter
view, though, there would be no disagreement between
our data and the weapon-focus findings, assuming subjects' attention to be caught by the weapon and not the
face of the weapon holder.
The point at issue here reaches back to a theme we mentioned earlier in this paper: If emotion has different effects
on different types of material, then we need to discover
the appropriate way to categorize the to-be-remembered
material. The contrast between "central to plot" and
"central to subjects' attention" strikes us as worth close
examination in this context. However, the relevant research will take a form different from that of the present
study, since provisions for tracking subjects' attention
will presumably be needed (Christianson & Loftus, 1991;
Christianson, Loftus, Hoffman, & Loftus, 1990). Alternatively, attention may be manipulated by the insertion of
deliberate •'attention magnets" into the to-be-remembered
materials. Whichever path is taken, we view such research
as crucial, given the apparent discrepancy between our
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results and the weapon-focus findings, and more to the
point, given the huge role played in our data by type of
to-be-remembered material.
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NOTES
1. In describing these studies, it is unclear whether one should speak
of arousal's effects on memory or emotion's effects. Relatively few
studies, for example, address the question of how arousal shapes memory in the absence of emotion. Likewise, emotion's memory effects may
be attributable to arousal, but they also may be attributable to some other
concomitant of emotion. In describing the evidence, therefore, we will
use the term emotion to refer to a "package" of factors (including arousal
itself) that may lie behind the observed effects. However, in describing
several studies in the literature, we adopt a more cautious stance, and
we will speak of arousal effects, simply because it is arousal that was
overtly manipulated in these studies and arousal that was explicitly monitored (e.g., via heart rate).
2. The Heuer and Reisberg study, just described, was modeled after
this earlier procedure.
3. The experiment reported as Experiment 1 was actua1ly completed
after that reported as Experiment 2; we have reversed the sequence for
expository ease.
4. In an initial analysis, we ascertained that there were no detectable
differences between the subjects from these two campuses; hence, the
two populations were merged in the analyses reported here.
5. This film had been developed for an earlier study by Burke and
Wessler (1990. [Memory and emotion]. Unpublished data.)
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